

Bureaucratic Politics

J. Garry Clifford

In the mid-1960s, when members of the Harvard Faculty Study Group on Bureaucracy, Politics, and Policy began to write their scholarly tomes, their sometime colleague in the mathematics department, the folk singer Tom Lehrer, inadvertently gave song to what came to be called the “bureaucratic politics” approach to the study of United States foreign policy. In his ballad about a certain German émigré rocket scientist, Lehrer wrote: “Once the rockets are up/ Who cares where they come down?/ That’s not my department!/ Said Wernher von Braun.”¹ Lehrer’s ditty, by suggesting that government is a complex, compartmentalized machine and that those running the machine do not always intend what results, anticipated the language of bureaucratic politics. The dark humor also hinted that the perspective might sometimes excuse as much as it explains about the foreign policy of the United States.

The formal academic version of bureaucratic politics came a few years later with the publication of Graham T. Allison’s *Essence of Decision*. Building on works by Warner R. Schilling, Roger Hilsman, Richard E. Neustadt, and other political scientists who emphasized internal bargaining within the foreign policy process, and adding insights from organizational theorists such as James G. March and Herbert A. Simon, Allison examined the Cuban missile crisis to refute the traditional assumption that foreign policy is produced by the purposeful acts of unified national governments. Allison argued that instead of resembling the behavior of a “rational actor,” the Kennedy administration’s behavior during the crisis was best explained as the “outcomes” of the standard operating procedures followed by separate organizations (the navy’s blockade, the Central Intelligence Agency’s U-2 overflights, and the air force’s scenarios for a surgical air strike) and as the result of compromise and competition among hawks and doves seeking to advance individual and organizational versions of the national interest. Allison soon collaborated with Morton H. Halperin to formalize the bureaucratic politics paradigm.² Other scholars followed

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¹ Tom Lehrer, *That Was the Year That Was* (Reprise Records RS 6179), recorded July 1965.

² Graham T. Allison, *Essence of Decision: Explaining the Cuban Missile Crisis* (Boston, 1971). See also Graham T. Allison, “Conceptual Models and the Cuban Missile Crisis,” *American Political Science Review*, 63 (Sept. 1969), 689–718. Richard E. Neustadt, *Presidential Power: The Politics of Leadership* (New York, 1960); Samuel P. Huntington, *The Common Defense: Strategic Programs in National Politics* (New York, 1961); Roger Hilsman, *To Move a Nation: The Politics of Foreign Policy in the Administration of John F. Kennedy* (Garden City, 1967); Warner

with bureaucratic analyses of topics including American decision making in the Vietnam War, nonrecognition of China, the Marshall Plan, American-Turkish relations, the Antiballistic Missile (ABM) decision, United States international economic policy, as well as refinements and critiques of the Allison-Halperin model. The John F. Kennedy School of Government at Harvard made bureaucratic politics the centerpiece of its new public policy program, and Allison became its dean. By the 1980s his framework was being hailed as "one of the most widely disseminated concepts in all of social science."³

The Allisonian message holds that United States foreign policy has become increasingly political and cumbersome with the growth of bureaucracy after World War II. Diversity and conflict permeate the policy process. There is no single "maker" of foreign policy. Policy flows instead from an amalgam of large organizations and political actors who differ substantially on any particular issue and who compete to advance their own personal and organizational interests as they try to influence decisions. The president, while powerful, is not omnipotent; he is one chief among many. Even when a direct presidential decision is reached, the game does not end because decisions are often ignored or reversed. Jimmy Carter may have thought he had killed the B-1 bomber, but a decade later the weapon was still being produced and its utility still being debated. Because organizations rely on routines and plans derived from experience with familiar problems, those standard routines usually form the basis for options furnished the president. Ask an organization to do what it has not done previously, and it will usually do what the United States military did in Vietnam: It will follow existing doctrines and procedures, modifying them only slightly in deference to different conditions.

Final decisions are also "political resultants," the product of compromise and bargaining among the various participants. As Allison puts it, policies are "*resultants* in the sense that what happens is not chosen . . . but rather results from compromise, conflict, and confusion of officials with diverse interests and unequal influence; *political* in the sense [of] . . . bargaining along regularized channels among individual members of government." Similarly, once a decision is made, considerable slippage can occur in implementing it. What follows is hostage to standard

R. Schilling, "The H-Bomb Decision: How to Decide without Actually Choosing," *Political Science Quarterly*, 76 (March 1961), 24-46; James G. March and Herbert A. Simon, *Organizations* (New York, 1958); Graham T. Allison and Morton H. Halperin, "Bureaucratic Politics: A Paradigm and Some Policy Implications," *World Politics*, 24 (Spring 1972), 40-80. This essay combines Allison's "organizational process" and "governmental politics" models into one paradigm.

³ Morton H. Halperin, "The Decision to Deploy the ABM: Bureaucratic and Domestic Politics in the Johnson Administration," *World Politics*, 25 (Oct. 1972), 62-96; Morton H. Halperin, *Bureaucratic Politics and Foreign Policy* (Washington, 1974); I. M. Destler, *Presidents, Bureaucrats, and Foreign Policy: The Politics of Organization Reform* (Princeton, 1974); David J. Alvarez, *Bureaucracy and Cold War Diplomacy: The United States and Turkey, 1943-1946* (Thessaloniki, 1980); Stephen D. Cohen, *The Making of United States International Economic Policy* (New York, 1977); Jerel A. Rosati, "Developing a Systematic Decision-Making Framework: Bureaucratic Politics in Perspective," *World Politics*, 33 (Jan. 1981), 234-51; Hadley Arkes, *Bureaucracy, the Marshall Plan, and the National Interest* (Princeton, 1973); Leslie Gelb, *The Irony of Vietnam: The System Worked* (Washington, 1979); James C. Thomson, "On the Making of U.S. China Policy, 1961-1969: A Study in Bureaucratic Politics," *China Quarterly*, 50 (April-June 1973), 220-43; Robert P. Haffa, Jr., "Allison's Models: An Analytic Approach to Bureaucratic Politics," in *American Defense Policy*, ed. John E. Endicott and Roy W. Stafford, Jr. (Baltimore, 1977), 224.

operating procedures and the interests of the implementers. Even when a president personally monitors performance, as John F. Kennedy tried to do with the navy's blockade during the missile crisis, organizational repertoires and hierarchies are so rigid and complex that the president cannot micromanage all that happens. Kennedy's own naval background notwithstanding, he did not know that antisubmarine warfare units were routinely forcing Soviet submarines to the surface, thus precipitating the very confrontations he so painstakingly tried to avoid.⁴

The bureaucratic politics perspective also suggests that intramural struggles over policy can consume so much time and attention that dealing effectively with external realities becomes secondary. Strobe Talbott's extraordinarily well informed accounts of arms control policy during the Carter and Reagan years confirm the truism that arriving at a consensus among the various players and agencies within the government is more complicated, if not more difficult, than negotiating with the Soviets. Ironically, officials who are finely attuned to the conflict and compartmentalism within the American government often see unitary, purposive behavior on the part of other governments. Recall the rush to judgment about the Soviet shooting down of a Korean airliner in 1983 as compared to the tortured ("rules of engagement") justifications that followed the destruction of an Iranian aircraft by the American naval cruiser *Vincennes* in 1988. Wallace Thies has shown that Washington's protracted efforts in the 1960s to coerce North Vietnam by calibrating military pressure and diplomatic signals were doomed from the outset; not only did senior officials assume that the messages received in North Vietnam would be the same as those sent, never realizing that everyday "noise" created by ongoing military operations might drown out the intended signals, but they were oblivious to the fact that Hanoi's revolutionary goals made negotiations on the terms Washington meant to convey impossible.⁵

Several criticisms have been leveled at the bureaucratic politics approach. Some critics contend that ideological core values shared by those whom Richard J. Barnet has called "national security managers" weigh more in determining policy than do differences attributable to bureaucratic position. The axiom "where you stand depends on where you sit" has had less influence, they argue, than the generational mind-set of such individuals as Paul Nitze, John J. McCloy, and Clark Clifford, whose participation in the foreign policy establishment spanned decades and cut across bureaucratic and partisan boundaries. Similarly, the perspective underestimates the extent to which the president can dominate the bureaucracy by selecting key players and setting the rules of the game. The Tower Commission report exposed the flaws of instant bureaucratic analysis when it simplistically blamed the Iran-Contra affair on a loose cannon in the White House basement and exonerated a detached president who was allegedly cut out of the policy "loop."⁶ The historian

⁴ Allison, *Essence of Decision*, 138, 162.

⁵ Strobe Talbott, *Endgame: The Inside Story of SALT II* (New York, 1979); Strobe Talbott, *Deadly Gambits: The Reagan Administration and the Stalemate in Nuclear Arms Control* (New York, 1984); Wallace J. Thies, *When Governments Collide: Coercion and Diplomacy in the Vietnam Conflict, 1964-1968* (Berkeley, 1980), 397-401.

⁶ See Robert J. Art, "Bureaucratic Politics and American Foreign Policy: A Critique," *Policy Sciences*, 4 (Dec.

must be careful in each case to judge how much of the buck that stops with the president has already been spent by the bureaucracy.

There is also the problem of evidence. Given the pitfalls in getting access to recent government documents, analysts of bureaucratic politics have relied heavily on personal interviews. Indeed, one scholar has stated that if "forced to choose between the documents on the one hand, and late, limited, partial interviews on the other, I would be forced to discard the documents." In addition to using available documents, James G. Blight and David A. Welch have pioneered a "critical oral history" method whereby participants and scholars meet to reexamine past events such as the Cuban missile crisis.⁷ Despite the value of having Robert McNamara, Dean Rusk, McGeorge Bundy, and others review their roles and answer hard questions for the record, many historians would prefer that the current guardians of national security declassify and transcribe all tape recordings of meetings held by the Executive Committee of the National Security Council during the October 1962 crisis. Just as bureaucratic processes can shape policy, so too can scholarly interpretations be skewed by a research method that permits participants to put excessive spin on the past.

Yet those defects in the bureaucratic politics approach may not hamper historians, who do not need models that predict perfectly. Unlike political scientists, they do not seek to build better theories or to propose more effective management techniques. Because the bureaucratic politics approach emphasizes state-level analysis, it cannot fully answer such cosmic questions as why the United States has opposed revolutions or why East-West issues have predominated over North-South issues. It is better at explaining the timing and mechanics of particular episodes, illuminating proximate as opposed to deeper causes, and showing why outcomes were not what was intended. The bureaucratic details of debacles like Pearl Harbor and the Bay of Pigs invasion are thus better understood than the long-term dynamics of war and peace. As such, to borrow Isaiah Berlin's anthropomorphic analogy, bureaucratic politics provides one of many truths the fox must know as he competes with the single-minded hedgehog.⁸ Whether one studies nuclear strategy, the rise of the military-industrial complex, or the United States alliance with Britain, bureaucratic history provides pertinent pieces to the jigsaw puzzle.

Scholars have made excellent use of the perspective when it fits. In a study of relations between the United States and Argentina during World War II, Randall Ben-

1973), 467-90; Stephen D. Krasner, "Are Bureaucracies Important (or Allison Wonderland)," *Foreign Policy*, 7 (Summer 1972), 159-79; Desmond J. Ball, "The Blind Men and the Elephant: A Critique of Bureaucratic Politics Theory," *Australian Outlook*, 28 (April 1974), 71-92; James H. Nathan and James K. Oliver, "Bureaucratic Politics: Academic Windfalls and Intellectual Pitfalls," *Journal of Political and Military Sociology*, 6 (Spring 1978), 81-91; Dan Caldwell, "Bureaucratic Foreign Policy-Making," *American Behavioral Scientist*, 21 (Sept./Oct. 1977), 87-110; Richard J. Barnet, *Roots of War* (Baltimore, 1972), esp. 48-91; Douglas Little, "Crackpot Realists and Other Heroes: The Rise and Fall of the Postwar American Diplomatic Elite," *Diplomatic History*, 13 (Winter 1989), 99-112; Theodore Draper, "Reagan's Junta: The Institutional Sources of the Iran-Contra Affair," in *The Domestic Sources of American Foreign Policy: Insight and Evidence*, ed. Charles W. Kegley and Eugene R. Wittkopf (New York, 1988), 131-41.

⁷ Neustadt, quoted in Allison, *Essence of Decision*, 181; James G. Blight and David A. Welch, *On the Brink: Americans and Soviets Reexamine the Cuban Missile Crisis* (New York, 1989).

⁸ Isaiah Berlin, *The Hedgehog and the Fox: An Essay on Tolstoy's View of History* (New York, 1957).

nett Woods shows that an inattentive president and feuding factions within the foreign affairs bureaucracy produced an oscillating "strategy" of treating Argentina both as pro-Fascist pariah and as penitent good neighbor. One of the few efforts to test Allison's model systematically, Lucien S. Vandenbroucke's analysis of the Bay of Pigs affair places much of the blame on officials in the Central Intelligence Agency who planned, organized, and sold the operation as a fail-safe version of the 1954 Guatemalan intervention; Vandenbroucke nonetheless concludes that President Kennedy, in his visceral Cold War values, wishful thinking, and discouragement of dissenters from "speaking up in church," was the real father of the fiasco. Jonathan G. Utley and Irvine H. Anderson, in separate accounts of the 1941 decision by the United States government to freeze Japanese assets, argue that organizational momentum and excessive zeal by second-echelon officials, most notably Assistant Secretary of State Dean Acheson, transformed the freezing order into a de facto embargo against Japan that neither Franklin D. Roosevelt nor Cordell Hull had intended when he signed it. In a recent study of the end of World War II in the Pacific, Leon V. Sigal demonstrates that both Washington and Tokyo behaved as if "each of their pieces on the board—armies, navies, air forces, diplomats—was acting on its own volition, moving according to its own program. There was, in short, no Pacific Endgame."⁹

Ernest R. May, chairman of the Harvard seminar that inaugurated the bureaucratic politics approach, has utilized it artfully and often. Because "one cannot run the facts of political history through a computer and test whether the outcome would have been different if one variable was changed and the others remained constant," May has been suggestive rather than definitive in studying historical lessons used and misused by bureaucrats and presidents. He has compared Harry S. Truman's decision not to intervene in China with that of John F. Kennedy and Lyndon B. Johnson to do so in Vietnam, and, in a recent collaboration, he and Richard E. Neustadt have shown how decision makers can better use history to "think in time," to "dodge bothersome analogues," and to "place" particular organizations within their own parochial understanding of the past.¹⁰

Greater application of the bureaucratic politics framework presupposes solid

⁹ Randall Bennett Woods, *The Roosevelt Foreign Policy and the "Good Neighbor": The United States and Argentina, 1941-1945* (Lawrence, 1979); Lucien S. Vandenbroucke, "Anatomy of a Failure: The Decision to Land at the Bay of Pigs," *Political Science Quarterly*, 99 (Fall 1984), 471-91. See also Trumbull Higgins, *The Perfect Failure* (New York, 1987); Jonathan G. Utley, "Upstairs, Downstairs at Foggy Bottom: Oil, Exports, and Japan, 1940-41," *Prologue*, 8 (Spring 1976), 17-28; Irvine H. Anderson, "The 1941 De Facto Embargo on Oil to Japan: A Bureaucratic Reflex," *Pacific Historical Review*, 44 (May 1975), 201-31; Leon V. Sigal, *Fighting to a Finish: The Politics of War Termination in the United States and Japan, 1945* (Ithaca, 1988), 283.

¹⁰ Ernest R. May, *The Truman Administration and China, 1945-1949* (Philadelphia, 1975), 49. See also Ernest R. May, *"Lessons" of the Past: The Use and Misuse of History in American Foreign Policy* (New York, 1973); and Ernest R. May and Richard E. Neustadt, *Thinking in Time: The Uses of History for Decision Makers* (New York, 1986). May's study of the Monroe Doctrine, which stressed the primacy of ambition and electoral politics in explaining the actions of President James Monroe and his cabinet in 1823, did not elicit universal acceptance from historians. Perhaps bureaucratic politics, as an interpretive framework, has greatest utility for the modern bureaucratic era. See Ernest R. May, *The Making of the Monroe Doctrine* (Cambridge, Mass., 1975); Harry Ammon, "The Monroe Doctrine: Domestic Politics or National Decision?" *Diplomatic History*, 5 (Winter 1981), 53-70; and Ernest R. May, "Response to Harry Ammon," *ibid.*, 71-73.

monographs on the foreign affairs bureaucracies and good biographies of key players. Indeed, May has urged "quasi-anthropological research just to establish who ought to be the personae in our narratives."¹¹ Thus far the historical literature, as might be expected, is fullest on the period before 1945. Building on the organizational synthesis of Robert H. Wiebe and Louis Galambos, historians have done fine work in charting the growth of the State Department and United States Foreign Service, analyzing the collective world view at State, and studying its regional experts. Philip Baram is particularly effective in combining the bureaucratic politics approach and an understanding of Open Door ideology to account for State's pro-Arab policies during World War II.¹² Similar studies of the State Department and other agencies after 1945 have perforce been more impressionistic, as the proliferation of documentary sources and interagency vagaries regarding declassification have compartmentalized much of the historical writing on post-World War II foreign policy. Recent efforts to integrate national security themes and to rescue intelligence history from the espionage buffs should, however, encourage more rigorous bureaucratic analysis of Cold War policy making.¹³

When can the perspective be most helpful? Because organizations function most predictably in a familiar environment, major transformations in the international system (wars and their aftermaths, economic crises, the Sino-Soviet split) require the analyst to study how institutional adjustments in United States policies resulted from the changes. Similarly propitious are transitions that bring in new players pledged to reverse the priorities of their predecessors, and particularly administrations in which the president, deliberately or not, encourages competition and initiative from strong-willed subordinates. Fiascos like the American failure to fend off the attack on Pearl Harbor and the Iran-Contra affair not only force agencies to reassess procedures and programs but also, even better, often spawn official investigations that provide scholars with abundant evidence for bureaucratic analysis. Budget battles, weapons procurement, coordination of intelligence, war termination, alliance politics—in short, any foreign policy that engages the separate attentions of multiple agencies and agents should alert the historian to the bureaucratic politics perspective.

¹¹ Ernest R. May, "Writing Contemporary International History," *Diplomatic History*, 8 (Spring 1984), 110.

¹² Robert H. Wiebe, *The Search for Order, 1877–1920* (New York, 1967); Louis Galambos, "The Emerging Organizational Synthesis in Modern American History," *Business History Review*, 44 (Autumn 1970), 279–90; Waldo H. Heinrichs, Jr., "Bureaucracy and Professionalism in the Development of American Career Diplomacy," in *Twentieth Century American Foreign Policy*, ed. John Braeman, Robert H. Bremner, and David Brody (Columbus, 1971), 119–206; Richard Hume Werking, *The Master Architects: Building the United States Foreign Service, 1890–1913* (Lexington, Ky., 1977); Robert D. Schulzinger, *The Making of the Diplomatic Mind: The Training, Outlook, and Style of United States Foreign Service Officers, 1909–1931* (Middletown, 1975); Philip Baram, *The Department of State in the Middle East, 1919–1945* (Philadelphia, 1978).

¹³ Barry Rubin, *Secrets of State: The State Department and the Struggle over U.S. Foreign Policy* (New York, 1985); John Ranelagh, *The Agency: The Rise and Decline of the CIA* (New York, 1986); Rhodri Jeffreys-Jones, *The CIA and American Democracy* (New Haven, 1989); Charles E. Neu, "The Rise of the National Security Bureaucracy," in *The New American State: Bureaucracies and Policies since World War II*, ed. Louis Galambos (Baltimore, 1987), 85–108; Anna Kasten Nelson, "The 'Top of Policy Hill': President Eisenhower and the National Security Council," *Diplomatic History*, 7 (Fall 1983), 307–26; John Lewis Gaddis, "Intelligence, Espionage, and Cold War Origins," *ibid.*, 13 (Spring 1989), 191–212.

Consider, for example, the complex dynamics of American entry into World War II. Looking at the period through the lens of bureaucratic politics reveals that FDR may have had more than Congress and public opinion in mind when making his famous remark: "it's a terrible thing to look over your shoulder when you are trying to lead—and to find no one there." The institutional aversion to giving commissioned naval vessels to a foreign power delayed the destroyers-for-bases deal for several weeks in the summer of 1940, and only by getting eight British bases in direct exchange for the destroyers could Roosevelt persuade the chief of naval operations, Adm. Harold Stark, to certify, as required by statute, that the destroyers were no longer essential to national defense. According to navy scuttlebutt, the president threatened to fire Stark if he did not support what virtually every naval officer opposed and the admiral agonized before acquiescing.¹⁴ Similarly, the army's initial opposition to peacetime conscription, FDR's dramatic appointment of Henry L. Stimson and Frank Knox to head the War and Navy departments in June 1940, his firing of Adm. James O. Richardson for his opposition to basing the Pacific fleet at Pearl Harbor, the refusal of the army and navy to mount expeditions to the Azores and Dakar in the spring of 1941, the unvarying strategic advice not to risk war until the armed forces were better prepared—all suggest an environment in which the president had to push hard to get the bureaucracy to accept his policy of supporting the Allies by steps short of war. Even the navy's eagerness to begin Atlantic convoys in the spring of 1941 and the subsequent Army Air Corps strategy of reinforcing the Philippines with B-17s were aimed in part at deploying ships and planes that FDR might otherwise have given to the British and Russians.¹⁵

Bureaucratic opposition also revealed itself in leaks. Col. Truman Smith, an intelligence officer on the General Staff with close ties to Charles Lindbergh and other isolationists, told former president Herbert Hoover in June 1941 that "no member of the General Staff wants to go to war. . . . Out of fifteen members in his section of the General Staff . . . no one could see any point of our going to war." When the chairman of the America First Committee made a speech the following July predicting the occupation of Iceland while American forces were still at sea, War Department lawyers considered the leak a violation of the Espionage Act of 1917 (even though the landing took place without incident). The more notorious leak of the Joint Army-Navy Board's RAINBOW-5 war plans to the *Chicago Tribune* just a few days before Pearl Harbor led the Federal Bureau of Investigation to trace the source to someone close to Army Air Corps chief Gen. Henry H. ("Hap") Arnold,

¹⁴ For Franklin D. Roosevelt's remark, see John E. Wiltz, *From Isolation to War, 1931–1941* (New York, 1968), 63; John Callan O'Laughlin, memorandum of telephone conversation with Herbert Hoover, Aug. 16, 1940, box 45, John Callan O'Laughlin Papers (Library of Congress); William R. Castle, Jr., diary, Sept. 20, 1940 (Houghton Library, Harvard University, Cambridge, Mass.).

¹⁵ J. Garry Clifford and Samuel R. Spencer, Jr., *The First Peacetime Draft* (Lawrence, 1986); J. Garry Clifford, "A Connecticut Colonel's Candid Conversation with the Wrong Commander-in-Chief," *Connecticut History*, 28 (Nov. 1987), 25–38; David A. Haglund, "George C. Marshall and the Question of Military Aid to England, May–June 1940," *Journal of Contemporary History*, 15 (Dec. 1980), 745–60; Mark A. Stoler, "From Continentalism to Globalism: General Stanley D. Embick, the Joint Strategic Survey Committee, and the Military View of National Policy during the Second World War," *Diplomatic History*, 6 (Summer 1982), 303–21; Waldo H. Heinrichs, Jr., *Threshold of War: Franklin D. Roosevelt and American Entry into World War II* (New York, 1988), 42–44, 144.

perhaps Arnold himself.¹⁶ This is not to argue that the German military attaché was correct in boasting to Berlin that pro-Nazi officers on the American General Staff would block United States intervention. It does affirm, however, that in steering the country toward war in 1940–1941, President Roosevelt could not move any faster than the armed forces were prepared to go. A zigzag course became inevitable.

In sum, this essay should be read as a modest plea for greater attention to bureaucratic politics. The perspective can enrich and complement other approaches. By focusing on internal political processes we become aware of the conflict within government before arriving at the cooperative core values posited by the corporatists or the neo-realists. In its emphasis on individual values and tugging and hauling by key players, bureaucratic politics makes personality and cognitive processes crucial to understanding who wins and why.¹⁷ Although bureaucratic struggles may be over tactics more than strategy, over pace rather than direction, those distinctions may matter greatly when the outcome is a divided Berlin and Korea, a second atomic bomb, an ABM system that no one really wanted, or the failure of last-minute efforts to avert war in the Pacific. Too easily dismissed as a primer for managing crises that should be avoided, the bureaucratic politics perspective also warns national security managers that when “governments collide,” the machines cannot do what they are not programmed to do. Rather than press “delete” and conceptualize policy only as rational action, it is incumbent on historians to know how the machines work, their repertoires, the institutional rules of the game, and how the box score is kept. The processes are peculiarly American. The British ambassador Edward Lord Halifax once observed that the foreign policy establishment in Washington was “rather like a disorderly line of beaters out shooting; they do put the rabbits out of the bracken, but they don’t come out where you would expect.”¹⁸ As historians of American foreign relations, we need to identify the beaters and follow them into the bureaucratic forest because the game is much bigger than rabbit.

¹⁶ Hoover, memorandum of conversation with Truman Smith, June 1, 1941, post-presidential individuals files, box 509A, Herbert Hoover Papers (Herbert Hoover Presidential Library, West Branch, Iowa); Grenville Clark to Henry L. Stimson, memorandum, July 18, 1941, Grenville Clark Papers (Baker Library, Dartmouth College, Hanover, N.H.); Thomas Fleming, “The Big Leak,” *American Heritage*, 38 (Dec. 1987), 64–71; James V. Compton, *The Swastika and the Eagle: Hitler, the United States, and the Origins of World War II* (Boston, 1967), 105–24.

¹⁷ Even attitudes toward sex become crucial if we examine, say, the vicious infighting in 1940–1943 that arose over charges of homosexuality against Undersecretary of State Sumner Welles, which eventually led to his resignation. See Irwin Gellman, *The Welles Connection* (forthcoming, 1991).

¹⁸ Lord Halifax to Sir John Simon, March 21, 1941, reel 2, Hickleton Papers (Churchill College Archives, Churchill College, Cambridge University, Cambridge, Eng.).

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